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NOTES AND COMMENTS

of the act in question, when circumstances warrant the receiving of such
evidence. Although this may never be established to the last second,
such hair-splitting is not always necessary in order to do justice. Frequently, a showing that an act was approved in the morning or afternoon,
or before or after a certain hour, may be sufficient to establish the actual
priority of the events in question, 19 and thus lead to a verdict based
upon fact rather than presumption.
Finally, it is submitted that this was a proper case for the disregarding of the general rule; that since the court properly placed upon the
Commonwealth the burden of proving that the statute was actually in
effect at the time of decedent's death, the court acted correctly in refusing
to apply the presumption of the general rule in the absence of any evidence from the Commonwealth that the statute had been passed before
decedent's death.
BENNETT

H.

PERRY, JR.

Constitutional Law-Validity of Penalties Imposed by States on Interstate Carriers for Violation of Weight and Size Regulations
Extensive use of the public highways by intrastate and interstate
trucking has caused states to resort to regulation of weights and sizes of
trucks.' With the enactment of such legislation, both before and after
Congress acted on the subject, courts have been faced with two problems: (1) whether a state in the exercise of its police power can regulate interstate carriers, and (2) what penalties a state may impose on an
interstate carrier for violation of the state regulation.
In 1924, Mr. Justice Brandeis, in Buck v. Kitykendall,2 declared that
it' re Dreyfous, 28 Abb. N. Cas. 27, 18 N. Y. Supp. 767 (1892), is quite similar to the principal case. A proceeding was brought to impose a tax of 1 per cent
on property bequeathed to the wife of deceased. The act under which the tax
was levied was approved on 20 April, 1891, after 8 o'clock. The decedent died
before 8 o'clock. It was held that the tax did not apply, since decedent's death
occurred before the passage of the act.
1 ALA. CODE tit. 36 §§ 89-94 (1940) ; IOWA CODE ANN. c. 321, §§ 321.452-321.481
(1949) ; N. C. GEN. SrAT. §§ 20-116, 20-118 (1953) ; N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFmC
LAW § 14; OHIO. REv. CODE c. 4513 (1954). Every state has enacted either
similar legislation or legislation accomplishing the same result.
2267 U. S. 307, 315-316 (1924). Plaintiff desired to operate an auto stage
line exclusively in interstate commerce, from a city in one state to a city in
another. Oregon granted him a license, but Washington refused, saying the territory had been filled. In an action, to enjoin enforcement of the applicable Washington law, the Court declared the state action unconstitutional, saying, "Its primary purpose is not regulation with a view to safety or to conservation of the
highways, but the prohibition of competition. It determines, not the manner of
use, but the persons by whom the highways may be used. . . . Its effect upon
such commerce is not merely to burden, but to obstruct it. Such action is forbidden by the Commerce Clause." (It should be noted that this was before any
federal legislation on the subject of carriers in interstate commerce.) This has
been precedent for all subsequent cases where there has been the possibility of
discriminating against interstate commerce. See also: George W. Bush & Sons Co.
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a state could not discriminate against interstate carriers, and later in.
Morris v. Duby,3 the Supreme Court set forth generally, what a state
might do by saying, "An examination of the acts of Congress discloses
no provision, express or implied, by which there is withheld from the
state its ordinary police power to conserve the highways in the interest
of the public and to prescribe such reasonable regulations for their use
as may be wise to prevent injury and damage to them. In the absence
of national legislation, especially covering the subject of interstate commerce, the state may rightly prescribe uniform regulations adapted to
promote safety upon its highways and the conservation of their use, applicable alike to vehicles moving in interstate commerce and those of its
own citizens."
With the passage of the Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 4 the
question arose to to whether this national legislation preEmpted the field
from state regulation of weights and sizes of interstate trucks. Stateo
v. Maloy, 267 U. S. 317, 324-325 (1925).

The Court there said: "The State
action in the Buck case was held to be unconstitutional not because the statute
prescribed an arbitrary test for the granting of permits, or because the director
of Public Works had exercised the power conferred arbitrarily or unreasonably,
but because the statute, as construed and applied, invaded a field reserved by the
Commerce Clause for federal regulation."
(Action by motor carrier to restrain Oregon
1274 U. S. 135, 143 (1927).
officials from enforcing a highway commission order reducing maximum load
from 22,000 pounds to 16,500 pounds. The Court held that although the order
prevented competition, since the carrier could not caru. as much, such a consideration was outweighed when competent authority deemed such weight injurious to
the highway for the use by the general public and unduly increased the cost of
maintenance and repair. The only way to attack this state action was to show
that it was arbitrary and unreasonable.) In Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374,
388-389 (1932) where carrier sought to restrain Texas state officials from enforcing
the weight and size limitations of the Motor Vehicle Act, the Court held the
statute constitutional, saying, "In exercising its authority over its highways, the
state is not limited to the raising of revenue for maintenance and reconstruction,
or to regulations as to the manner in which vehicles shall be operated, but the
state may also prevent the wear and hazards due to excessive size of vehicles
and weight of load. Limitations of tize and weight are manifestly subjects within
the broad range of legislative discretion. To make scientific precision a criterion of
constitutional power would be to subject the state to an intolerable supervision
hostile to the basic principles of our government and wholly beyond the protection
which the general clause of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to secure. When
the subject lies within the police power of the state, debatable questions as to
reasonableness are not for the cQurts but for the legislature, which is entitled to
form its own judgment, and its action within its range of discretion cannot be set
aside because compliance is burdensome." Plaintiff said this was unconstitutional
class legislation because passenger travel was treated differently, but the Court held
that the peculiar importance of transportation for persons to provide communities
with resources, both of employment and recreation, along with educational and
social interests, were sufficient to support this classification.
'49 STAT. 543, 49 U. S. C. § 301, et seq. (Supp. 1935), as amended, 54 STAT.
919 (1940), 49 U. S. C. § 301, et seq. (1952).
, Whitney v. Fife, 270 Ky. 434, 109 S. W. 2d 832 (1937) (Writ of prohibition
to restrain judge from issuing warrants of arrest and prosecuting plaintiffs for
violation of the weight limit law); Smithart v. State, 133 Tex. Crim. Rep. 145,
109 S. W. 2d 207 (1937) ; Johnson v. State, 133 Tex. Crim. Rep. 144, 109 S. W. 2d
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and federal courts, when confronted with the problem, held that it did
not. In 1938, the Supreme Court decided, in South CarolinaHighway
Dept. v. Barnwell Bros. Inc., 7 that such state legislation was a proper
exercise of the police power. In reviewing the history of Section 225
of the federal act of 1935,8 concerning weights and sizes, the Court in,
Maurer v. Hamilton,9 declared that since Congress had not specifically
207 (1937) ; Morrison v. State, 133 Tex. Crim. Rep. 141, 109 S. W. 2d 205 (1937)

(where truck driver appealed from the imposition of a fine for violating the weight
load regulation).
'Werner Transportation Co. v. Hughes, 19 F. Supp. 425, 432 (N. D. Ill.
1937)

(Suit by motor carriers to restrain Secretary of State of Illinois from en-

forcing state weight load limitations. The court, in denying the injunction, said:
"While of course, a state may not discriminate against interstate commerce in the
absence of national legislation, especially covering the subject, the state may rightly
prescribe uniform regulations adapted to promote safety upon its highways and
the conservation of their use, applicable alike to vehicles moving in interstate commerce and those of its own citizens." The fact that surrounding states had a
higher weight limit did not mean that the statute imposed an unreasonable burden
upon interstate commerce.).
1303 U. S. 177, 189-190, rehearing denied, 303 U. S. 667 (1938). Plaintiffs
sought to restrain state officials from enforcing the weight and size statute of South
Carolina contending that it violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, had been superseded by federal legislation, and imposed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. The South Carolina statute prescribed
a maximum width for vehicles of 90 inches, whereas other states normally allowed
96 inches. The Court reversed the district court's holding that this statute excessively burdened interstate commerce, saying, "so long as the state action does
not discriminate, the burden is one which the Constitution permits because it is
an inseparable incident of the exercise of a legislative authority, which, under the
Constitution, has been left to the states. . . . In the absence of such legislation
[Congressional] the judicial function, under the Commerce Clause as well as the
Fourteenth Amendment, stops with the inquiry whether the state legislature in
adopting regulations such as the present has acted within its province, and whether
the means of regulation chosen, are reasonably adapted to the end sought."
' Originally, at the time of Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598 (1940), this
was section_225 of the Federal Motor Carrier Act. Substantially unchanged, today
it is in Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 325, and reads: "The
Commission is authorized to investigate and report on the need for federal regulation of the sizes and weight of motor vehicles and combinations of motor vehicles
and of the qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees of all motor
carriers and private carriers of property by motor vehicle and in such investigation the Commission shall avail itself of the assistance of all departments and
bureaus of the Government and of any organization of motor carriers having
special knowledge of any such matter."
' 309 U. S. 598 (1940). Plaintiffs, carriers of new autos by motortruck, sought
to restrain enforcement of Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code, contending the federal legislation superseded this state act. The Court interpreted Section 225 as
creating strictly an investigatory power and, without clear and specific legislation
on the subject, power to regulate was reserved to the states. Many cases have
followed this interpretation, and it stands today: Lattavo Bros., Inc. v. Hudock,
119 F. Suop. 587, 589 (W. D. Pa. 1953), aff'd, 347 U. S. 910 (1954) (Plaintiff
sought injunction restraining public official from enforcing weight limitations of
Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code, by which plaintiff was detained and required to
remove his excess load, and arrested with requirement to pay fine. In denying the
injunction, the court said, "It is no longer open to dispute that a state in the
exercise of its police power and in the absence of Congressional action, may impose
reasonable restrictions upon the weight and size of vehicles which travel over its
highways, equally applicable to intrastate and interstate commerce, without running
afoul of the Commerce or Due Process Clause. . .

."

[emphasis supplied]);

Whitney v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 65 (E. D. Ky. 1941) (interstate motor carriers
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provided for regulation, the power was thereby reserved to the states.
This section has remained substantially unchanged, and without further
act of Congress, it is well established today that states may regulate the
weights and sizes of interstate carriers.
However, by the recent decision of Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines,
Inc.,1° a case involving penalties which may be imposed on interstate
were denied injunction to restrain enforcement of weight law); PhiladelphiaDetroit Lines, Inc. v. Simpson, 37 F. Supp. 314 (S. D. W. Va. 1940), aff'd, 312
U. S. 655 (1941) (Carrier of autos sought injunction retraining enforcement of
weight and size laws and was denied) ; Darnall Trucking Co. v. H. Simpson, 122
W. Va. 656, 12 S. E. 2d 5i6, appeal dismissed, 313 U. S. 549 (1940).
10 348 U. S. 61, 64 (1954). In this case an interstate carrier, operating under
a certificate of convenience and necessity from the ICC, and from the state agency,
sought to enjoin state authorities from enforcing the state regulation provided for
the suspension of the carrier's right to use the highways for ninety days, or one
year for habitual violators, on the ground that such an enforcement measure conflicted with the Federal Motor Carrier Act. The Supreme Court of Illinois, in
Hayes Freight Lines, Inc. v. Castle, 2 Ill. 2d 58, 117 N. E. 2d 106 (1954), declared that the penalty could not be imposed on interstate operators, but could be
imposed on intrastate operators. The U. S. Supreme Court affirmed, the substance of the reasoning being, that since the Federal Motor Carrier Act is all embracing with regard to issuance and suspension of certificates of public convenience
and necessity "it would be odd if a state could take action amounting to a suspension or revocation of an interstate carrier's commission granted right to operate."
As to whether the public interest requiring safe hiighways necessitates the suspension of right to use the highways for habitual violators of the weight limit,
quaere.
It appears that a state may impose many burdens on interstate carriers without
fatally obstructing interstate commerce: In Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. Wood,
344 U. S. 157, 162 (1952), rehearing denied, 345 U. S. 913 (1953), an Arkansas
statute requiring interstate as well as intrastate carriers to obtain a permit, was
held constitutional. Mr. Justice Black there said: "In this situation our prior cases
make clear that a state can regulate so long as no undue burden is imposed on
interstate commerce and that a mere requirement for a permit is not such a burden.
It will be time enough to consider apprehended burdensome conditions when and
if the state attempts to enforce them." (Emphasis supplied.) But the Court said
the state had no discretionary right to refuse the permit to the interstate carrier.
For other examples see: Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Bd. of R. R. Commissioners, 332 U. S. 495 (1947) (annual state tax levied on interstate carriers for use
of highways allowed) ; California v. Thompson, 313 U. S. 109, 116 (1941) (A
California statute required every transportation agent to procure a license from
the state Railroad Commission, to pay a license fee, and to file a bond. The
Court said: "If there is authority in the state, in the exercise of its police power,
to adopt such regulations affecting interstate transportation, it must be deemed
to possess the power to regulate the negotiations for such transportation where they
affect matters of local concern which are in other respects within state regulatory
power, and where the regulation does not infringe the national interest in maintaining the free flow of commerce and in preserving uniformity in the regulation of the
commerce in matters of national concern.") ; Eichholz v. Public Service Commission, 306 U. S. 268 (1939) (an interstate motor carrier's practice of hauling merchandise, consizned from St. Louis, Missouri, to persons in Kansas City, Missouri,
over the state line to Kansas City, Kansas, and then back to its intended destination in Missouri, was a mere subterfuge to evade permit requirements of Missouri,
and the state could require that he obtain a permit.) ; H. P. Welch Co. v. New
Hampshire, 306 U. S. 79 (1939) (before Federal Motor Carrier Act's effective
date, state law limited hours of duty for drivers) ; Clark v. Poor, 274 U. S. 554
(1927) (carrier required to procure certificate and pay a tax for use of highways) : Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160 (1916) (licensing and registration) ;
Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610 (1915) (licensing and registration required
of non-resident operators) ; Dobrn Transfer Co. v. Hoegh, 116 F. Supp. 177 (S. D.
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carriers for violating these weight and size regulations, Mr. Justice Black
said that although regulation by states was not of itself invalid, a state
could not prohibit an interstate carrier from using the highways, even
though the carrier had habitually violated the state law. His language
was, "We are not persuaded . . . that the conventional forms of punishment are inadequate to protect states from overweighted or improperly
loaded motor trucks." No indication was given as to what specific
penalties a state could validly enforce, but the Court did point out that
since the Interstate Commerce Commission could revoke certificates of
motor carriers which willfully refuse to comply with any lawful regulation of the Commission, and a Commission regulation requires that motor
carriers abide by valid state highway regulations, relief to suspend a
carrier would be through the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Before this decision, states had resorted to various methods to enforce their weight and size regulations. A very common one was allowing peace officers to weigh interstate vehicles, and upon finding them
overloaded, require the removal of the excess weight. 1 Also, the driver
could be arrested and the owner fined. 12 Injunctive relief 13 could be
sought to force a carrier to comply with state regulations, and finally,
Iowa 1953) (state may condition use of highway by requiring a fee to maintain
it) ; State v. Nagle, 148 Me. 197, 91 A. 2d 397 (1952) (license or permit) ; Council Bluffs Transit Co. v. City of Omaha, 154 Neb. 717, 49 N. W. 2d 453 (1951)
(city ordinance routing interstate traffic) ; McClean Trucking Co. v. City of New
York, 116 N. Y. S. 2d 292 (1952) (city motor use tax pursuant to statutory
authorization) ; Arrow Carrier Corp. v. Traffic Commission of City of New York,
99 N. Y. S. 2d 138 (1950) (routing traffic in city) ; Ex parte Truelock, 139 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 365, 140 S. W. 2d 167 (1940) (requiring a certificate of public convenience and necessity).
"ALA. CODE, tit. 36, § 85 (1940); IOWA CODE ANN. c. 321, § 321A65 (1949);
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-118.1 (1953); OHIO Ray. CODE § 4513.33 (1954). Most
of these statutes are very similar and read like the North Carolina statute, supra:
"Any peace officer having reason to believe that the weight of a vehicle and load
is unlawful is authorized to weigh the same either by means of portable or stationary scales, and may require that such vehicle be driven to the nearest scales in
event such scales are within 2 miles. The officer may then require the driver
to unload immediately such portion of the load as may be necessary to decrease the
gross weight of such vehicle to the maximum therefor specified in this article.
All material so unloaded shall be cared for by the owner or operator of such
vehicle at the risk of such owner or operator. Any person who refuses to permit
a vehicle being operated by him to be weighed as in this section provided or who
refuses to drive said vehicle upon the scales provided for weighng for the purpose
of being weighed, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
"ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 83 (1940) ; IOWA CODE ANN. c. 321, §§ 321A77, 321.482
(1949); N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-176, 20-118(1) (1953); N. Y. VEHICLE AND
It should be
TRAwFIc LAW § 70 (1952); OHIo Ray. CODE § 4513.99 (1954).
noted that these are typical provisions for enforcement although the manner of
arriving at the penalty differs in the various states. North Carolina imposes a fine
proportionate to amount of overload, others base the fine on the number of
offenses committed, and others provide still other methods.
" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 62-121.34 (1950). This is part of the N. C. Motor
Truck Act of 1947.
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an action for damages1 against the carrier could be brought by the
government official in charge. These methods are still widely used,
and the Supreme Court decision' 5 apparently does not encompass them
in its prohibition. But, when the penalty imposed results in a complete
obstruction of interstate commerce, as in the Hayes FreightLines case,1
by suspending the carrier's right to use the highways of the state, the
courts will strike the penalty. However, in the twilight area of balancing
the state's interest in the safety and maintenance of its highways, against
the national interest in protecting the free flow of interstate commerce,
the Supreme Court will probably uphold reasonable state regulations
which fall short of preventing interstate commerce. This conclusion
would seem to follow from the provision' 7 in many state statutes for a
construction not in conflict with federal legislation or the Constitution.
Louis A. BLEDSOE, JR.

Labor Law-Railway Labor Act-Federal-State Conflict Over Union
Shop
In 1951 Congress amended the Railway Labor Act' to permit carriers and the union representative of their employees to enter into
"union shop" agreements 2 under certain conditions. The amendment
specifically states the agreements may be entered into "nothwithstanding
any other provisions of the Act, or of any other statute or law of the
United States or territory thereof, or any state."3 The problem is thus
"' IowA CoDE ANN. c. 321, § 321.475 (1949). In such case the superintendent
of Public Works sues the owner of the vehicle for the damages the vehicle does
to the highway, and the recovery goes to the highway fund.
Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 348 U. S. 61 (1954).
16 Ibid.
1
ALA. CODE,

tit. 48, § 28 (1940) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 62-121.39 (1950). The
North Carolina statute reads: "(1) This article shall apply to persons and vehicles engaged in interstate commerce over the highways of this state and the
Commission may, in its discretion, require such carriers to file with it copies of
their respective interstate authority, registration of their vehicles operated in this
State, and the observance of such reasonable rules and regulations as the Commismission may deem advisable in the administration of this article and for the protection of persons and property upon the highways of the State, except insofar as
the provisions of this article may be inconsistent with, or shall contravene, the
Constitution and laws of the U. S. (2) The Commission or its authorized representative is authorized to confer with and hold joint hearings with the authorities
of other states or with the Interstate Commerce Commission or its representatives
in connection with any matter arising under this article, or under the Federal
Motor Carrier Act which may directly or indirectly affect the interests of the
people of this state or the transportation policy declared by this article of the Interstate Commerce Act."
'64 STAT. 1238, 45 U. S. C., § 152 (eleventh) (1951).
2 "Union shop" agreements permitted by the Act are agreements requiring, as
a condition of continued employment, that within 60 days following the beginning
of such employment, or of the effective date of such agreements, whichever is later,
all employees shall become members of the labor organization representing their
craft or class.
'64 STAT. 1238, 45 U. S. C., § 152 (eleventh) (1951).

